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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-ONTARIO GUEST STATUTE HELD AP-
PLICABLE WHERE ONTARIO PLAINTIFF SUED NEW YORK DEFENDANT
FOR Loss OCCASIONED BY ONTARIO ACCIDENT.
On May 7, 1969, Arthur Kuehner, the defendant's intestate and
a resident of Buffalo, New York, drove his automobile from that city
to Fort Erie in the Province of Ontario, Canada. There he picked up
Amie Neumeier, the plaintiff's intestate, an Ontario resident. Their
plan was to travel to nearby Long Beach, Ontario, for the purpose of
repairing summer cottages which were owned by defendant's intestate.
However, at a railroad crossing in the Town of Sherkston, Ontario, en
route to Long Beach, the auto was struck by a train of the defendant
Canadian National Railway Company. Both plaintiff's and defendant's
intestates were instantly killed. Plaintiff's intestate, the deceased pas-
senger's wife (an Ontario resident) subsequently commenced a wrong-
ful death action in New York against both the deceased driver's estate
and the railway company. As an affirmative defense, the defendant
estate pleaded the Ontario guest statute, which would deny recovery
absent a finding of gross negligence.' The defendant railway also in-
terposed defenses in reliance upon this statute. The plaintiff con-
tended that the Ontario statute was not applicable, and moved, pur-
suant to New York procedure, 2 to dismiss the affirmative defenses. The
supreme court, at special term, found that the Ontario guest statute
was applicable and denied the plaintiff's motions.3 Thereafter, the
plaintiff appealed to the appellate division which, in a closely divided
decision, reversed the supreme court's ruling.4 New York law was
held applicable, and the defenses based upon the Ontario guest statute
were dismissed. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals, with one
1. The Highway Traffic Amendment Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 64, § 20(2)
(1966), amending ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 172, § 105(2) (1960), which provides:
Notwithstanding subsection 1, the owner or driver of a motor vehicle,
other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying business for com-
pensation, is not liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to,
or the death of any person being carried in, or upon, or entering, or getting
on to or alighting from the motor vehicle, except where such loss or damage was
caused or contributed to by the gross negligence of the driver of the motor
vehicle.
2. N.Y. Orv. PRAc. LAw § 3211(b) (McKinney 1963).
3. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 63 Misc. 2d 766, 313 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
4. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 37 App. Div. 2d 70, 322 N.Y.S.2d 867 (4th Dep't 1971).
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judge in dissent, held: judgment of the appellate division reversed;
the Ontario guest statute, rule of the jurisdiction of plaintiff's intestate's
residency and that of the site of the accident, was properly pleaded
as an affirmative defense to plaintiff's wrongful death action. Neumeier
v. Kuehner, 81 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
One hundred and forty-five years ago, Samuel Livermore ob-
served:
If I do not mistake the matter, it is particularly important in
this country to have established some fixed and correct principles for
the determination of the questions, which may be expected to arise
from the various opposing laws of the several states . . . . [T]here
should be some settled principles and . . . these should be uniformly
observed. No such uniformity exists at present; and unless I am greatly
deceived we have no cases decided by our various courts, in which we
find so much error and confusion, as in those which involve the
conflicting laws of different states.5
Unhappily, the accuracy of Livermore's observation has been too
little diminished by the passing of the years. Although the choice-of-
law area has commanded considerable judicial and scholarly atten-
tion, 6 an approach has yet to be accepted into practice which is capable
of resolving choice-of-law problems with the degree of uniformity, pre-
dictability, expeditiousness and fairness of result that both bench and
bar would find desirable.
The doctrine of lex loci delicti-the application of the law of the
place of the tort's commission-was enunciated by the first Restate-
ment of Conflicts as the appropriate rule for resolving choice-of-law
problems arising in multi-state tort actions. 7 Lex loci's greatest strength
is the near-absolute predictability of result which its application affords.
Yet inherent in such strength resides lex loci's overwhelming weakness
-an inflexibility which can lead to anomalous and oftentimes harsh
results. The advent of mass automobile ownership and widespread
commercial air travel greatly increased the likelihood that the situs
of the occurrence underlying a tort claim would be of a fortuitous na-
ture, thereby exacerbating lex loci's analytical shortcomings. Thus,
5. D. CAVERS, THE CHOIcE-oF-LAw PROCESS 290 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
CAVERS], quoting S. LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHIcH ARISE
FROM THE CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS(1828).
6. See, e.g., CAVERS, supra note 5, wherein the author presents a lively survey of
the philosophies of numerous choice-of-law scholars, his own among them.
7. RESTATEM ENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 378-81, 391 (1934).
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there was ample necessity for the "invention" of a new doctrine that
would replace lex loci's markedly outdated approach.
The New York Court of Appeals' repudiation of the lex loci
delicti rule in Babcock v. Jackson8 marked a change of direction which
was widely hailed as an advance in choice-of-law jurisprudence.9 The
court in Babcock was unwilling merely to substitute the Second Re-
statement rule of decision which invokes lex loci as a starting point,
though sanctioning divergence under specified conditions.10 In its
"grouping of contacts," "center-of-gravity" and "significant relation-
ship" language, the Babcock majority paid formalistic homage to the
Second Restatement, yet essentially relied upon an interest analysis
to conclude that the law of New York was to be applied where both
driver and passenger were New York domiciliaries. As Ontario was
the site of the auto accident which gave rise to the suit, recovery upon
the lex loci doctrine would have been predicated upon the application
of that province's recovery-preclusive guest statute.
Following Babcock came a line of New York cases which alterna-
tively relied upon either a grouping of contacts or an interest anal-
ysis theory-with a notable absence of consistency. The apparent pre-
dilection of these decisions was to allow recovery by injured New
York plaintiffs." The decision in Tooker v. Lopez 2 appeared to have
resolved the dilemma involved in selecting the most appropriate choice-
of-law approach by firmly committing the court to an interest anal-
ysis approach. In Tooker, a New York plaintiff was seeking recovery
from a New York defendant on the basis of negligence alleged in con-
nection with an auto accident that had occurred in Michigan. De-
fendant submitted that Michigan's guest statute, which sets gross
negligence as the standard for recovery,' 3 was applicable, thereby pre-
cluding plaintiff's recovery. The court looked to New York's compul-
8. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
9. See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 COLUm. L. REV. 1212 (1963), in which the comments of six conflict-of-law
scholars are collected.
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 9, 145-46, 175 (1969).
11. See, cited in chronological order, Kell v. Henderson, 26 App. Div. 2d 595,
270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dep't 1966); Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d
380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966); Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290
N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968). But see Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262
N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965), where the court refused to apply New York law in the case of a
Colorado accident in which both driver and guest were New York residents.
12. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
13. MimH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2101 (1960).
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sory auto liability insurance law' 4 to find that whereas New York
had an interest in providing compensation to injured New York
plaintiffs, Michigan, whose guest statute was viewed as existing solely
for the protection of its drivers and insurance carriers against fraudu-
lent or collusive suits, had "absolutely no interest in the application
of its law."'1 The court reasoned that "the insurer [was] a New York
carrier and the [New York resident] defendant [was] sued in the courts
of this State."'16 In concluding that there was thus no reason to apply
Michigan law and thereby deny the New York plaintiff's recovery,
the majority affirmed the reasoning of Babcock and appeared to align
itself squarely with the adherents of interest analysis. However, it
should be noted that the presence of a New York plaintiff has been
a factor common to all cases in which New York law had been ap-
plied to the detriment of a New York defendant. Since the plaintiff in
Tooker was also a New York domiciliary, the court was not called
upon to decide the more difficult choice-of-law question that arises
when the foreign jurisdiction is both the plaintiff's residence as well
as the site of the accident. The potential for such a choice-of-law
question did exist, however, within the Tooker factual context. A
Michigan resident had also been an injured passenger in the accident
underlying the Tooker suit. Although the plaintiff had elected not to
bring an action in New York, Judge Keating, writing for the majority,
strongly intimated what might have been the result had she done so:
"Applying the choice of law rule which we have adopted [interest
analysis], it is not an 'implicit consequence' that the [non-New York
resident] ...should be denied recovery. Under the reasoning adopted
here, it is not at all clear the [Michigan guest statute] would govern."'17
Thus was the stage set for a non-resident of New York, earlier
created merely for the purposes of Judge Keating's hypothetical in
Tooker, to come in fact to a New York court, seeking compensation for
injuries suffered in an accident in his home jurisdiction, whose guest
statute, if applied, would presumably preclude recovery.
In the instant case, the court was confronted with that very same
law-fact pattern Judge Keating had envisioned in his Tooker hypo-
thetical. By imposing an interest analysis approach analogous to that
in Tooker, the court in Neumeier might easily have arrived at a result
14. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 311(4) (McKinney 1970).
15. 24 N.Y.2d at 575, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 580, 249 N.E.2d at 400, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
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contrary to that of the instant case. For example, the court could have
found that New York has a substantial interest in affording protection
to guests injured through the negligence of New York drivers, as evi-
denced by its automobile insurance law which requires liability cover-
age regardless of the site of operation.18 The court might further have
found, conversely, that Ontario, as the domicile of the plaintiff but of
neither the insurance company nor of the defendant, had "absolutely
no interest in the application of its laws."' 19
Despite the availability of the aforementioned approach, the
Neumeier majority asserted that the appellate division, in re-
fusing to apply the Ontario guest statute, had misread the court's
opinion in Tooker.20 In distinguishing the case before it, the majority
looked to the plaintiff's Ontario residency, stating that although "[i]t
is clear ... New York has a deep interest in protecting its own resi-
dents, injured in a foreign state, against unfair or anachronistic statutes
of that state, it has no legitimate interest in ignoring the public policy
of a foreign jurisdiction . . . and in protecting the plaintiff-guest
domiciled and injured there .... ,,21 Similarly, the court viewed New
York's compulsory insurance requirement as insufficient evidence of a
state interest in allowing a nonresident plaintiff to recover from a
New York defendant when the laws of the plaintiff's domicile would
preclude recovery.22 The majority concluded that "[t]he compulsory
insurance requirement is designed to cover a car-owner's liability, not
create it .... "23
Though to this point in its analysis, the majority, while obviously
on its way to a rejection of the plaintiff's argument, appeared to be
moving within the context of a conventional interest analysis, this was
not to be the case. Acknowledging the lack of consistency that char-
acterized its decisions in multi-state accident suits, the court attributed
this shortcoming to the difficulty of "discover[ing] the purposes or poli-
cies underlying the relevant local law rules of the respective jurisdic-
tions involved." 24 The court proceeded to add that "[i]t is even more
difficult, assuming that these purposes or policies are found to conflict,
18. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 311(4) (McKinney 1970).
19. 24 N.Y.2d at 575, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
20. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as instant case].
21. Id. at 125-26, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
22. Id. at 126, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 127, 286 N.B.2d at 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
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to determine on some principled basis which should be given effect at
the expense of the others. ' 25 With this language, the majority chal-
lenged the ability of a court to discern with precision the subjective
policy interests of those jurisdictions involved in a multi-state lawsuit
-an assumption indispensable to the justification of an interest anal-
ysis approach.
If interest analysis was thus to be disparaged, how would the
court dispose of the choice-of-law question at bar? Chief Judge Fuld
proposed to fill the ideological void created by his attack upon the effi-
cacy of interest analysis with the implementation of the tripartite
choice-of-law principles which he formulated in his concurring opin-
ion in Tooker.26
Identifying the third principle as governing the choice-of-law
question in the case at bar, the majority found that application of New
York rather than Ontario law would be "sanctioning forum shopping"
and thereby "impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system
[and] producing great uncertainty for litigants." 27 Moreover, allowance
of recovery to the nonresident plaintiff was not viewed as furthering the
"substantive law purposes" of New York.28 Thus, in the majority's
view, the facts of the instant case had failed to satisfy the conditions
which the third principle posed as necessary to justify the displacement
of the law of the state of the accident. Relying upon this analysis, the
court reversed the appellate division, and reinstated the order of spe-
25. Id.
26. 24 N.Y.2d at 585, 249 N.E.2d at 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 532-33, reading as
follows:
1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domicilied in the
same state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control
and determine the standard of care which the host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and
that state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held
liable by reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him under the
tort law of the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was
injured in the state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver
who has come into that state should not-in the absence of special cir-
cumstances-be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in
different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable
rule of decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred but not
if it can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance
the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working
of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.
27. Instant case at 129, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
28. Id.
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cial term, allowing those affirmative defenses interposed in reliance
upon the Ontario guest statute to stand.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Breitel appeared unconvinced of
the value of either an interest analysis or of the choice-of-law princi-
ples proffered by Chief Judge Fuld. His opinion expressed a general
dissatisfaction with the interest analysis approach and stated- that,
despite the decision in Babcock, "lex loci delictus29 is the normal rule
... to be rejected only when it is evident that the situs of the accident
is the least of the several factors or influences to which the accident
may be attributed. . . ."30 Thus, Judge Breitel aligned himself closely
with the approach adopted by the Second Restatement 3' and chose
to apply the recovery-preclusive Ontario law "simply on the proposi-
tion that plaintiff has failed by her allegations to establish that the
relationship to this State was sufficient to displace the normal rule
that the lex loci delictus should be applied .... 32
Judge Bergan, the lone dissenter, disputed the majority's claim
that its resort to a choice-of-law rule which favors New York plaintiffs
over those of a foreign jurisdiction was not a "consequence of invidi-
ous discrimination."' s The dissent implied that the New York ap-
proach might have created a personal law which favored New York
domiciliaries, and asserted that "[n]either because of 'interest' nor 'con-
tact' nor any other defensible ground is it proper to say in a court of
law that the rights of one man whose suit is accepted shall be adjudged
differently on the merits on the basis of where he happens to live.13 4
Opining that the court's decision in Tooker dictated a corresponding
application of New York law in the instant case, Judge Bergan decried
the opinion of the majority, which he viewed as "deciding ... that
although it will prevent a New York car owner from asserting the
defense of a protective foreign statute when a New York resident in
whose rights it has an 'interest' sues; it has no such 'interest' when, it
accepts the suit . . . of a nonresident. ' 35 Such a distinction, declared
Judge Bergan, is "inadmissible. s3 6
29. Judge Breitel employs the phrase, lex loci delictus, and the term appears so
.written in the opinions of this and other courts. However, the entire phrase' from the
Latin being lex loci delicti commissi, it is more appropriately abbreviated as lex loci
delicti. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1056 (rev..4th ed. 1968).
.30. Instant case at 131, 286 N.E.2d at 459, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 9, 145-46, 175 (1969).
32. Instant case at 131-32, 286 N.E.2d at460 335 N.Y.S.2d-at 73. --
33. Id. at 126, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
34. Id. at 132-33, 286 N.E.2d at 460, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
35. Id. at 133, 286 N.E.2d at 461, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
36. Id.
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It is submitted that the majority's decision marks progress in New
York jurisprudence to the extent that it departs from an interest anal-
ysis approach as the favored choice-of-law rule. Chief Judge Fuld's
opinion notes the difficulty involved in discovering and then contrast-
ing the multiple state interests and policies potentially embodied
within the various laws relevant to the particular case.37 A court at-
tempting to proceed within an interest analysis schema will often
be constrained to indulge in conclusory speculation as to the exis-
tence and the nature of state interests. Moreover, when such judicial
spadework "turns up" interests that are perceived as conflicting, it
has been suggested by Professor Cavers that interest analysis "com-
pels an attribution (often of dubious authenicity) of primacy to one
purpose or another."38 Such subjectivity is unlikely to produce the
sound jurisprudential basis that the just disposition of choice-of-
law problems demands. In applying interest analysis in order to re-
solve the choice-of-law question in Tooker, the court was forced to
rely upon a single student-written law review article as its basis for
determining the nature of Ontario's interest in the application of its
guest statute.39 The authoritativeness of a court's ultimate findings
is jeopardized by its reliance upon "authority" of such character and
quality, and this episode represents a grave indictment of the method-
ology which interest analysis entails.
Whereas the court's determination to disavow interest analysis
may well be applauded, such repudiation does not in the same stroke
justify the court's rejection of the result which the application of an
interest analysis might have produced in the instant case. Similarly, the
absence of a consistent choice-of-law approach in the line of cases pre-
ceding Tooker does not justify a summary rejection of the preceden-
tial relevance that they bear for Neumeier. The cases do represent
New York choice-of-law justice in a variety of law-fact permutations.
It is submitted that although no one of these cases clearly dictates a
particular result in the instant case, their cumulative weight suggests
that the Neumeier majority may have rendered less than adequate
justice in its refusal to allow the Canadian plaintiff the protection of
New York law. Babcock established the possibility that a New York
defendant may be subjected to liability under New York law despite
37. Id. at 127, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
38. CAVERS, suipra note 5, at 108.
39. 24 N.Y.2d at 572, 249 N.E.2d at 396, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 521, citing Survey of
Canadian Legislation, 1 U. TORONTo L. J. 358, 366 (1936).
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the occurrence of his negligence in a foreign jurisdiction whose re-
covery-restrictive statute would shield him from liability. Macey v.
Rozbicki 40 and Tooker confirmed this point of New York case law.
Miller v. Miller41 demonstrated that such liability could be extended
even to the case of a non-New York driver whose negligence occurred
in connection with an accident in his own state, whose laws would limit
recovery, and under whose laws the car which he was operating was
insured. In Kell v. Henderson,42 New York law, permitting plaintiff's
recovery, was applied to an accident that occurred in New York, in-
volving a plaintiff and a defendant who were both residents of On-
tario. The court cannot thus claim to distinguish Neumeier from its
precursors either on the basis of plaintiff's Ontario residency or of the
accident's Ontario situs. By the same token, the court should not be
permitted its argument that the plaintiff could not, with a "straight
face," reasonably expect the application of New York law "in support
of an Ontario guest picked up in Ontario and who enjoyed no similar
protection under Ontario law."'43 Certainly the plaintiff's expectation
of protection is arguably as strong as that of the plaintiff's in Kell.
Moreover, the court in Tooker explicitly disapproved such an "ex-
pectations" approach, stating that "[t]he argument that the choice
of law in tort cases should be governed by the fictional expectation of
the parties has been rejected unequivocally .... "44 Indeed, Professor
Cavers suggests that "[r]eliance on this factor seems especially dubious
with respect to tort questions .... [I]t is difficult often to escape the
suspicion that a finding of the parties' expectations is simply a vehicle
to express the court's conclusion that the choice of law it approves is
a fair one. ' 45
The Neumeier result, though not easily harmonized with the
mood of its forerunners, might yet have been justifiable had it served
a larger purpose of choice-of-law jurisprudence. The court's decision
in Babcock to reject the lex loci doctrine, while acclaimed by choice-
40. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
41. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
42. 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dep't 1966); but see Arbuthnot
v. Allbright, 35 App. Div. 2d 315, 316 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1970) (Ontario rule applied
in identical law-fact situation).
43. Instant case at 130, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 71, citing Reese,
Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 548, 563 (1971).
44. 24 N.Y.2d at 577, 249 N.E.2d at 399, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 526, relying on Miller
v. Miller, 22 N.Y:2d 12, 20, 237 N.E.2d 877, 881, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 741 (1968).
45. D. CAVERS, supra note 5, at 69.
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of-law scholars, 46 was not without real costs. If lex loci suffered from
an inability to deal with the peculiar demands of the individual case,
which by the time of Babcock could no longer be countenanced, it is
no less true of lex loci that the uniformity and predictability of result
that it afforded were qualities prized by both bench and bar. Perhaps
it is an indication of the great value that the profession places upon
the certainty of legal rules that the lex loci doctrine, otherwise so lack-
ing in qualities to recommend it, has so long survived.
The sacrifice of a certain measure of predictability, as achieved by
the court in forsaking lex loci, can be readily justified if our rules be-
come in turn the instruments of greater justice. However, to discard
lex loci without replacing it with a rule of comparable outcome-prog-
nostic power is both to ignore a material need of the profession and to
threaten considerable injustice in the aggregate. Hence the Babcock
court, in abandoning lex loci, assumed the concomitant responsibility
of providing the bench and the bar with guidance sufficient to re-
solve choice-of-law problems with reasonable precision. The line of
cases leading to Neumeier is remarkable largely in the tangle of con-
trasting choice-of-law approaches which it represents. Although
"grouping of contacts,". "center of gravity," and "interest analysis" lan-
guage was alternatively employed, the cumulative result was an ad hoc
approach to choice-of-law determination. Clearly, the jurisprudential
vacuum created by lex loci's demise had not been satisfactorily filled
at the time of the instant decision. Few could have thus complained
of the harsh47 Neumeier result had it served as the quid pro quo for
the implementation of a new jurisprudential orientation-be it a
"rules" or an "approach" doctrine-48 -of a quality and comprehensive-
46. See supra note 9.
47. The possibility that an Ontario court might not have chosen to apply the
guest statute (text cited supra note 1) had the Neumeier case been brought there, ac-
centuates the harshness of the instant result. Sensitive to the guest statute's severity,
Ontario courts have often managed to circumvent its application. The courts have
demonstrated a ready willingness to find that the relationship between driver and
passenger was something other than that of guest-host, based either upon the finding
of a master-servant relationship, as in Harrison v. Toronto Motor Car Ltd., [1945] 1
D.L.R. 286 .(1944), or upon evidence of even nominal expense-sharing by the passenger,
as in Lemieux v. Bedard, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 421 (1952). In the instant case, plaintiff's
intestate was accompanying the driver for the purpose of doing house repairs on property
owned by defendant's intestate. A Canadian court, interested in avoiding the guest
statute when possible, might well have seized upon this fact to find something other
than a mere guest-host relationship, and thereby justify the waiver of the guest statute
and the granting of recovery.
48. For a critical examination of the contrasting merits of "rules" versus "ap-
proach" doctrines, see Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L.
REv. 315 (1972).
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ness sufficient to provide for reasonably equitable and predictable re-
suits in future litigation.
The instant decision iterated three choice-of-law "principles" with
which it proposed both to avoid the shortcomings of interest analysis
and to fill the jurisprudential void occasioned by the renunciation of
lex loci.49 It is submitted that the court's institution of these princi-
ples accomplished neither purpose effectively. The first two principles
relate to law-fact patterns in which: (1) the driver and his guest are
residents of the same state; or (2) the driver and the accident site are
associated with the same jurisdiction. Both situations pose relatively
easy choice-of-law problems.50 The true mettle of the principles is
tested by their ability to resolve the more difficult questions that arise,
as in the instant case, when the driver and guest are domiciled in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. The third of Chief Judge Fuld's principles pur-
ports to deal with this situation, erecting a lex loci rule that will gov-
ern unless it can be demonstrated that "displacing that normally ap-
plicable rule [lex loci], will advance the relevant substantive law pur-
poses without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system
or producing great uncertainty for litigants." 51 It is suggested that in its
broad language, Chief Judge Fuld's third principle lacks the analyt-
ical power necessary to eschew interest analysis thoroughly and to pro-
vide a self-sufficient basis for the achievement of uniform and pre-
dictable results. In applying the principle, a court must first decide
when and where the lex loci is to be displaced. In the process, it will
be compelled, in order to determine the "substantive law purposes"52
involved and the likely results of lex loci displacement, to engage in
that very interest analysis which the court sought to avoid. Thus, in
the instant case, the court professes to decide the choice-of-law ques-
tion in simple reliance upon Chief Judge Fuld's principles. In reality,
the court was forced to engage in interest analysis so that it might
eventually determine that the lex loci, Ontario's guest statute, was
not to be replaced by New York law. Evidences of such interest anal-
ysis are the court's determination that New York, its compulsory
insurance law notwithstanding, has no interest in applying its own
49. For text of the principles, see supra note 26.
50. But see Bray v. Cox, 39 App. Div. 2d 299, 333 N.Y.S.2d 783 (4th Dep't 1972).
The court applied New York law to a case involving Ontario parties and liability in-
surance, in apparent contradiction to the mandate of the third principle. Bray was
decided one week before the instant case.
51. 24 N.Y.2d at 585, 249 N.E.2d at 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
52. Instant case at 129, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
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law in behalf of an Ontario plaintiff.m To the contrary, suggested the
court, New York has an affirmative interest in discouraging forum
shopping5 4 and, ultimately, in protecting New York defendants. The
instant decision, while providing guidance to future litigants in its
confirmation of the court's proclivity for championing the interests
of New York residents, whether plaintiff or defendant, does little to
elevate New York choice-of-law jurisprudence from the mire of sub-
jectivity and ad hoc issue determination in which it has struggled
since the time of Babcock v. Jackson.
The scope of this note does not extend to a consideration of doc-
trinal alternatives to the jurisprudence of Neumeier. However, some
familiarity with the nature of choice-of-law problems leads one to ob-
serve that the search for an acceptable choice-of-law approach is ren-
dered exceedingly difficult by two inherently conflicting demands-
uniformity of result in the aggregate, and fairness of result for the indi-
vidual. The qualitative difficulty with which these disparate goals are
reconciled is greatly magnified by the quantitative problems involved
in attempting to deal with the sheer magnitude of the potentially con-
flicting laws of innumerable forums. The enormity of the task thus
posed is a challenge to the legal scholar's belief in the ultimate prob-
lem-solving capabilities of a legal system. Any rule capable of affording
a modicum of both predictability and justness of result would mark a
most estimable contribution in an area of such complexity as to define
the quality of our system's logic at its margin.
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53. Id. at 125-26, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
54. Id. at 129, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70-71. The instant case renders
the utilization of New York jurisdiction less attractive for the nonresident. Another
recent court of appeals decision, Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 378
N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972), makes New York jurisdiction more difficult for
the nonresident to obtain. Viewed together, it might be suggested that the two cases
represent an attempt to stem the tide of cases flowing into New York in the wake of
the court's opinion in Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1966).
